E-Letter To Congressman Earl Hilliard (D-Ala.), Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-Ca.), Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (D-Ga.), Congressman Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), Congressman Donald Payne (D-N.J.) Congresswoman Diane Watson (D-Ca.) Re: International Relations Committee Hearing On U.S. Policy Toward Iraq (Part 1)
Tomorrow, as members of the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, you are scheduled to participate in a full committee hearing concerning U.S. policy toward Iraq, and the prospects for war and peace and a variety of related issues. From what I understand, the individual requests of some of you, that certain individuals be invited to provide testimony to the committee, have been denied. One such requested witness, from what I have learned, is former UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter.
Interestingly, it has not simply been a partisan impediment that some of your efforts have been met with, but rather, certain Democratic members on the committee, like ranking member Congressman Tom Lantos (D-Ca.), who have provided the most difficult of obstacles. As of the time of this writing, the hearings are anything but balanced and diverse, in terms of those who have been invited to speak on the hearing's subject, with virtually every scheduled witness, from Richard Perle to James Woolsey, having previously displayed leanings against Iraq and toward U.S. military action against that nation.
This scenario, of a committee hearing stacked with witnesses of a certain orientation of mind, has inspired me to write to you that I may offer a few points of consideration that you may reflect over and review before and during tomorrow's hearing. These suggested subjects all pertain to matters that are of the utmost importance if war is to be avoided, the root of the Iraq-U.S. conflict understood, and peace and prosperity restored or established in that part of the world. Many of these topics, in my view, have been inadequately handled by the mainstream media and your fellow lawmakers.
The Lifting Of Sanctions At A Time Certain. Why has there not been any willingness, on the part of the Bush administration and very little on the part of the preceding administration to discuss a time certain, when sanctions would be lifted on Iraq? Iraq's decision to grant unconditional and unfettered access to U.N. weapons inspections was partially influenced by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's vague promise that inspections will eventually be followed by discussions regarding the lifting of sanctions. Without the clear delineation of terms and scenarios under which the U.S. would support the lifting of sanctions on Iraq what real incentive does Iraq have to comply with an intrusive, supposedly internationally balanced proceeding that has already been shown to be biased and skewed in favor of American demands? Scott Ritter, a former inspector, denied the opportunity to testify before you, by other committee members, has written that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has, since 1992, planted its spies among members assigned by the UN to monitor the Iraqi armament program. To what degree has the UN inspections process been violated and tampered with by the United States? A legitimate question for the U.S. Congress to explore at this critical hour, I think.
Furthermore, what incentive is there for President Saddam Hussein's regime to cooperate with inspections if in addition to no clear view of how the undertaking benefits Iraq, relative to sanctions, the United States has determined the outcome of inspections will have no impact on their stated foreign policy objective of regime change in Iraq? After primarily demanding in the past that Iraq agree to inspections with no pre-conditions, the United States has now added more such demands - working for a new U.N. resolution on Iraq that in addition to inspections requires Iraq's acquiescence to the U.S. worldview on human rights, reparations, and the accounting for Gulf War prisoners. With no clear linkage between Iraq's acceptance, compliance, and obeisance to these terms and the lifting of sanctions, President Saddam Hussein's cooperation with the United States and the United Nations on these matters amounts to little more than his voluntary participation in his country's public emasculation. If there are negative consequences for Iraq's lack of cooperation with any of the aforementioned matters - even war - shouldn't there naturally flow positive consequences for full and successful cooperation?
Did Saddam Hussein Really Gas His Own People? Members of Congress, the mainstream press and some segments of the alternative media have repeatedly voiced the charge that "Saddam Hussein gassed his own people." But the U.S. Army's own War College denied such charges back in 1990. There have been no discovery of bodies and no proof presented that verifies the allegations. I encourage you to ask all of the International Relations Committee's invited experts to offer their opinion of the 1990 U.S. War College Report on the subject. Were Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R. Rosenberger, of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. War College wrong when they wrote that there was no evidence that supports today's common claim that "Saddam Hussein gassed his own people." They wrote the following of the issue, in the context of the Iraq-Iran war:
Throughout the war the United States practiced a fairly benign policy toward Iraq. Although initially disapproving of the invasion, Washington came slowly over to the side of Baghdad. Both wanted to restore the status quo ante to the Gulf and to reestablish the relative harmony that prevailed there before Khomeini began threatening the regional balance of power. Khomeini's revolutionary appeal was anathema to both Baghdad and Washington; hence they wanted to get rid of him. United by a common interest, Iraq and the United States restored diplomatic relations in 1984, and the United States began to actively assist Iraq in ending the fighting. It mounted Operation Staunch, an attempt to stem the flow of arms to Iran. It also increased its purchases of Iraqi oil while cutting back on Iranian oil purchases, and it urged its allies to do likewise. All this had the effect of repairing relations between the two countries, which had been at a very low ebb.
In September 1988, however -- a month after the war had ended -- the State Department abruptly, and in what many viewed as a sensational manner, condemned Iraq for allegedly using chemicals against its Kurdish population. The incident cannot be understood without some background of Iraq's relations with the Kurds. It is beyond the scope of this study to go deeply into this matter; suffice it to say that throughout the war Iraq effectively faced two enemies -- Iran and the elements of its own Kurdish minority. Significant numbers of the Kurds had launched a revolt against Baghdad and in the process teamed up with Tehran. As soon as the war with Iran ended, Iraq announced its determination to crush the Kurdish insurrection. It sent Republican Guards to the Kurdish area, and in the course of this operation -- according to the U.S. State Department -- gas was used, with the result that numerous Kurdish civilians were killed. The Iraqi government denied that any such gassing had occurred. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Schultz stood by U.S. accusations, and the U.S. Congress, acting on its own, sought to impose economic sanctions on Baghdad as a violator of the Kurds' human rights.
Having looked at all of the evidence that was available to us, we find it impossible to confirm the State Department's claim that gas was used in this instance. To begin with there were never any victims produced. International relief organizations who examined the Kurds -- in Turkey where they had gone for asylum -- failed to discover any. Nor were there ever any found inside Iraq. The claim rests solely on testimony of the Kurds who had crossed the border into Turkey, where they were interviewed by staffers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
We would have expected, in a matter as serious as this, that the Congress would have exercised some care. However, passage of the sanctions measure through the Congress was unusually swift -- at least in the Senate where a unanimous vote was secured within 24 hours. Further, the proposed sanctions were quite draconian (and will be discussed in detail below). Fortunately for the future of Iraqi-U.S. ties, the sanctions measure failed to pass on a bureaucratic technicality (it was attached as a rider to a bill that died before adjournment).
It appears that in seeking to punish Iraq, the Congress was influenced by another incident that occurred five months earlier in another Iraqi-Kurdish city, Halabjah. In March 1988, the Kurds at Halabjah were bombarded with chemical weapons, producing a great many deaths. Photographs of them Kurdish victims were widely disseminated in the international media. Iraq was blamed for the Halabjah attack, even though it was subsequently brought out that Iran too had used chemicals in this operation, and it seemed likely that it was the Iranian bombardment that had actually killed the Kurds.
Thus, in our view, the Congress acted more on the basis of emotionalism than factual information, and without sufficient thought for the adverse diplomatic effects of its action...
The continuation of this claim against Iraq, if it is baseless, is nothing more than an exercise in propaganda designed to whip up resentment and hatred of Saddam Hussein, in order to justify war. Hopefully this Congress will carefully get to the bottom of this charge and not fall victim to a similar form of "emotionalism" that has aided the circulation of accusations that haven't been demonstrated as true or at least thoroughly investigated.
The United States Used Depleted Uranium On Iraq. While The U.S. seeks to pin charges of poisonous gas use - against his own citizens - on Saddam Hussein, it was the United States that used weapons with depleted uranium in them in the Gulf War, against Iraq. Although frequently dismissed as a conspiracy charge crafted by Saddam Hussein against the U.S.; it is a fact admitted to by the U.S. government that depleted uranium, in the tips of U.S. weaponry, was used in the Gulf War against Iraq. In fact that admission is available to this very day on the Department Of Defense website(http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1998/b08041998_bt412-98.html).
Here is what the Department of Defense said about the matter in a August 4, 1998 statement:
"The Gulf War was the arena for the first battlefield use of armor-piercing munitions and reinforced tank armor incorporating depleted uranium. Depleted uranium played a key role in the overwhelming success of U.S. forces during the Gulf War. While DU showed the metal's clear superiority for both armor penetration and armor protection, its chemical and radiological properties gave rise to concerns about possible combat and non-combat health risks associated with DU use"
That is the Department of Defense speaking, not Iraqi propaganda from Saddam Hussein.
The Iraqis have documented the results of the use of depleted uranium and its effects on civilians. From a report published by the College of Medicine at Basrah University:
Further Evidence on Relation between Depleted Uranium and Incidence of Malignancies among Children in Basra, Southern Iraq
Dr. Alim Yacoup ; Dr. Imad Al-Sa’ doun ; Dr. Genan G. hassan,
College of Medicine, Basrah University
Information on the incidence of malignancies among children below 15 years of age in Basrah, southern Iraq was updated to include 1999 in addition to the already reported for the period 1990-1998. There has been a 100 % rise in the incidence of various forms of leukemia among children in 1999 compared to 1990 while the reported percentage increase 1997 compared to 1990 for the same forms was 60 %. The corresponding rise for all malignancies among such children in 1999 compared to 1990 was 242 % while the percentage increase in 1997 compared to 1990 was 120 %. The overall incidence rate of all malignancies was 10.1 per 100, 000 of children below 15 years of age compared to 3.98 in 1990 and 7.22 in 1997. During the period from 1993 to 1998 the average annual incidence rate of malignancies among children ranged from 3.1 per 100,000 in Shatt Al-Arab district to 11.8 per 100, 000 in Al-Hartha. In 1999 the reported rates ranged from 5.3 in Abu-Al-khassib to 13.2 in Al-Zubier district with noticeable increase in such rates in all districts in Basra including Basra center, Qurna, Mudaina and shatt-Al-Arab. The findings reported in 1999 provided further epidemiological evidence that the increased incidence of malignancies among children in Basrah is related to exposure to depleted uranium used by the western allies during their aggression on Iraq in 1991.
Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney sponsored HR 3155, the "Depleted Uranium Munitions Suspension and Study Act of 2001" a bill that would "require the suspension of the use, sale, development, production, testing, and export of depleted uranium munitions pending the outcome of certain studies of the health effects of such munitions, and for other purposes" and wherein Congress made the following findings:
(1) The highest regard should be given to the health and safety of the Nation's military personnel.
(2) Among the characteristics of depleted uranium munitions are that (A) they are pyrophoric, resulting in the munition burning upon impact with a target, and (B) the impact of a depleted uranium munition on a target creates aerosol particles, which can be inhaled.
(3) Depleted uranium munitions were used by the United States in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War in Southwest Asia and during the conflicts in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro) during the 1990s, with approximately 300 metric tons of depleted uranium being used during the Gulf War, three metric tons being used in Bosnia, and over nine metric tons being used in Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro.
(4) The United States has provided or sold depleted uranium and depleted uranium munitions to allied nations, and the United Kingdom used depleted uranium munitions during the Persian Gulf War.
(5) Depleted uranium munitions have been used at numerous United States military installations, proving grounds, and testing facilities.
(6) The Yugoslav and Iraqi Governments have claimed that depleted uranium is affecting the health of their people, although such claims have yet to be independently verified.
(7) No definitive cause has been established for the various illnesses (commonly referred to as `Gulf War Syndrome') that currently affect approximately 130,000 United States servicemembers and veterans who served in Southwest Asia during the Persian Gulf War.
(8) The British Royal Navy, Canadian Navy, and United States Navy have all announced that they would phase out use of depleted uranium munitions.
(9) It has been reported that depleted uranium munitions use has proliferated to more than 20 nations.
(10) Crash investigators of the Federal Aviation Administration are instructed, in FAA Advisory Circular 20-123, dated December 20, 1984, to `handle with caution' any depleted uranium that they encounter in crash investigations, and are instructed that `the main hazard associated with depleted uranium is the harmful effect the material could have if it enters the body,' and that `[i]f particles are inhaled or digested, they can be chemically toxic and cause a significant and long-lasting irradiation of internal tissues,'.
(11) The 1949 Geneva Convention specifically outlines the precautions warring nations must take to avoid harming civilian populations, and it would be a violation of the 1977 Protocol to that Convention to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering to civilians, as depleted uranium has the potential to cause.
(12) The Department of Defense has acknowledged that stocks of depleted uranium munitions have been contaminated with transuranic elements, including plutonium.
(13) Plutonium is an extremely toxic, carcinogenic, and radioactive material with a half-life of 4.5 billion years.
Since all of this is known by the Congress regarding depleted uranium, the possibility of its use, again, in Iraq, and its effects on Iraqi civilians and U.S. soldiers should be thoroughly reviewed, explored and debated before the International Relations Committee.
Getting To The Root Of The Conflict With Iraq. Just 8 days before his Aug. 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein met with April Glaspie, then America's ambassador to Iraq. It would be the very last high-level contact between the two countries before Iraq went to war. From a translation of Iraq's transcript of the meeting, released that September, it was widely concluded that Ms. Glaspie had given Saddam a green light to invade its neighbor.
Saddam Hussein inquired with April Glaspie, as to whether or not the United States would approve of his invasion of Kuwait, formerly the 19th province of Iraq. Ambassador Glaspie informed Saddam Hussein that it was U.S. custom to take no position on the matter as it fell into the context of an "Arab-Arab" dispute.
Of course that supposed custom of neutrality, offered by April Glaspie, would not be honored where Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was concerned.
On Sunday, September 23nd, the New York Times ran the transcript of the July 25, 1990 meeting between Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and April Glaspie. A copy of the Arabic transcript was translated by ABC News and given to the New York Times. Ms. Glaspie, after the transcript was released, said the transcript distorted her view but was accurate to a "great deal." Here are excerpts:
SADDAM HUSSEIN: I have summoned you today to hold comprehensive political discussions with you. This is a message to President Bush. You know that we did not have relations with the U.S. until 1984 and you know the circumstances and reasons which caused them to be severed. The decision to establish relations with the U.S. were taken in 1980 during the two months prior to the war between us and Iran.
When the war started, and to avoid misinterpretation, we postponed the establishment of relations hoping that the war would end soon.
But because the war lasted for a long time, and to emphasize the fact that we are a non-aligned country, it was important to re-establish relations with the U.S. And we choose to do this in 1984.
It is natural to say that the U.S. is not like Britain, for example, with the latter's historic relations with Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq. In addition, there were no relations between Iraq and the U.S. between 1967 and 1984. One can conclude it would be difficult for the U.S. to have a full understanding of many matters in Iraq. When relations were re-established we hoped for a better understanding and for better cooperation because we too do not understand the background of many American decisions. We dealt with each other during the war and we had dealings on various levels. The most important of those levels were with the foreign ministers.
We had hoped for a better common understanding and a better chance of cooperation to benefit both our peoples and the rest of the Arab nations.
But these better relations have suffered from various rifts. The worst of these was in 1986, only two years after establishing relations, with what was known as Irangate, which happened during the year that Iran occupied the Fao peninsula.
It was natural then to say that old relations and complexity of interests could absorb many mistakes. But when interests are limited and relations are not that old, then there isn't a deep understanding and mistakes could have a negative effect. Sometimes the effect of an error can be larger than the error itself.
Despite all of that, we accepted the apology, via his envoy, of the American President regarding Irangate, and we wiped the slate clean. And we shouldn't unearth the past except when new events remind us that old mistakes were not just a matter of coincidence.
Our suspicions increased after we liberated the Fao peninsula. The media began to involve itself in our politics. And our suspicions began to surface anew, because we began to question whether the U.S. felt uneasy with the outcome of the war when we liberated our land.
It was clear to us that certain parties in the United States -- and I don't say the President himself -- but certain parties who had links with the intelligence community and with the State Department -- and I don't say the Secretary of State himself -- I say that these parties did not like the fact that we liberated our land. Some parties began to prepare studies entitles: "Who will succeed Saddam Hussein?" They began to contact gulf states to make them fear Iraq, to persuade them not to give Iraq economic aid. And we have evidence of these activities.
Iraqi Policy on Oil
Iraq came out of the war burdened with $40 billion debts, excluding the aid given by Arab states, some of whom consider that too to be a debt although they knew -- and you knew too -- that without Iraq they would not have had these sums and the future of the region would have been entirely different.
We began to face the policy of the drop in the price of oil. Then we saw the United States, which always talks of democracy but which has no time for the other point of view. Then the media campaign against Saddam Hussein was started by the official American media.
The United States thought that the situation in Iraq was like Poland, Romania or Czechoslovakia. We were disturbed by this campaign but we were not disturbed too much because we had hoped that, in a few months, those who are decision makers in America would have a chance to find the facts and see whether this media campaign had had any effect on the lives of Iraqis. We had hoped that soon the American authorities would make the correct decision regarding their relations with Iraq. Those with good relations can sometimes afford to disagree.
But when planned and deliberate policy forces the price of oil down without good commercial reasons, then that means another war against Iraq. Because military war kills people by bleeding them, and economic war kills their humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good standard of living. As you know, we gave rivers of blood in a war that lasted eight years, but we did not lose our humanity.
Iraqis have a right to live proudly. We do not accept that anyone could injure Iraqi pride or the Iraqi right to have high standards of living.
Kuwait and the U.A.E. were at the front of this policy aimed at lowering Iraq's position and depriving its people of higher economic standards. And you know that our relations with the Emirates and Kuwait had been good. On top of all that, while we were busy at war, the state of Kuwait began to expand at the expense of our territory.
You may say this is propaganda, but I would direct you to one document, the Military Patrol Line, which is the borderline endorsed by the Arab League in 1961 for military patrols not to cross the Iraq-Kuwait border.
But go and look for yourselves. You will see the Kuwaiti border patrols, the Kuwaiti farms, the Kuwaiti oil installations -- all built as closely as possible to this line to establish that land as Kuwaiti territory.
Since then, the Kuwaiti Government has been stable while the Iraqi Government has undergone many changes. Even after 1968 and for 10 years afterwards, we were too busy with our own problems. First in the north then the 1973 war, and other problems. Then came the war with Iran which started 10 years ago.
We believe that the United States must understand that people who live in luxury and economic security can each an understanding with the United States on what are legitimate joint interests. But the starved and the economically deprived cannot reach the same understanding.
We do not accept threats from anyone because we do not threaten anyone. But we say clearly that we hope that the U.S. will not entertain too many illusions and will seek new friends rather than increase the number of its enemies.
I have read the American statements speaking of friends in the area. Of course, it is the right of everyone to choose their friends. We can have no objections. But you know you are not the ones who protected your friends during the war with Iran. I assure you, had the Iranians overrun the region, the American troops would not have stopped them, except by the use of nuclear weapons.
I do not belittle you. But I hold this view by looking at the geography and nature of American society into account. Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle.
You know that Iran agreed to the cease-fire not because the United States had bombed one of the oil platforms after the liberation of the Fao. Is this Iraq's reward for its role in securing the stability of the region and for protecting it from an unknown flood?
Protecting the Oil Flow
So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the U.A.E. and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights.
I say to you clearly that Iraq's rights, which are mentioned in the memorandum, we will take one by one. That might not happen now or after a month or after one year, but we will take it all. We are not the kind of people who will relinquish their rights. There is no historic right, or legitimacy, or need, for the U.A.E. and Kuwait to deprive us of our rights. If they are needy, we too are needy.
The United States must have a better understanding of the situation and declare who it wants to have relations with and who its enemies are. But it should not make enemies simply because others have different points of view regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.
We clearly understand America's statement that it wants an easy flow of oil. We understanding American staying that it seeks friendship with the states in the region, and to encourage their joint interests. But we cannot understand the attempt to encourage some parties to hard Iraq's interests.
The United States wants to secure the flow of oil. This understandable and known. But it must not deploy methods which the United States says it disapproves of -- flexing muscles and pressure.
If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you.
War and Friendship
You can come to Iraq with aircraft and missiles but do not push us to the point where we cease to care. And when we feel that you want to injure our pride and take away the Iraqis' chance of a high standard of living, then we will cease to care and death will be the choice for us. Then we would not care if you fired 100missiles for each missile we fired. Because without pride life would have no value.
It is not reasonable to ask our people to bleed rivers of blood for eight years then to tell them, "Now you have to accept aggression from Kuwait, the U.A.E., or from the U.S. or from Israel."
We do not put all these countries in the same boat. First, we are hurt and upset that such disagreement is taking place between us and Kuwait and the U.A.E. The solution must be found within an Arab framework and through direct bilateral relations. We do not place America among the enemies. We pace it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year make it apparent that America did not regard us as friends. Well the Americans are free.
When we seek friendship we want pride, liberty and our right to choose.
We want to deal according to our status as we deal with the others according to their statuses.
We consider the others' interests while we look after our own. And we expect the others to consider our interests while they are dealing with their own. What does it mean when the Zionist war minister is summoned to the United States now? What do they mean, these fiery statements coming out of Israel during the past few days and the talk of war being expected now more than at any other time?
* * *
I do not believe that anyone would lose by making friends with Iraq. In my opinion, the American President has not made mistakes regarding the Arabs, although his decision to freeze dialogue with the P.L.O. was wrong. But it appears that this decision was made to appease the Zionist lobby or as a piece of strategy to cool the Zionist anger, before trying again. I hope that our latter conclusion is the correct one. But we will carry on saying it was the wrong decision.
You are appeasing the usurper in so many ways -- economically, politically and militarily as well as in the media. When will the time come when, for every three appeasements to the usurper, you praise the Arabs just once?
APRIL GLASPIE: I thank you, Mr. President, and it is a great pleasure for a diplomat to meet and talk directly with the President. I clearly understand your message. We studied history at school That taught us to say freedom or death. I think you know well that we as a people have our experience with the colonialists.
Mr. President, you mentioned many things during this meeting which I cannot comment on on behalf of my Government. But with your permission, I will comment on two points. You spoke of friendship and I believe it was clear from the letters sent by our President to you on the occasion of your National Day that he emphasizes --
HUSSEIN: He was kind and his expressions met with our regard and respect.
Directive on Relations
GLASPIE: As you know, he directed the United States Administration to reject the suggestion of implementing trade sanctions.
HUSSEIN: There is nothing left for us to buy from America. Only wheat. Because every time we want to buy something, they say it is forbidden. I am afraid that one day you will say, "You are going to make gunpowder out of wheat."
GLASPIE: I have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.
HUSSEIN: But how? We too have this desire. But matters are running contrary to this desire.
GLASPIE: This is less likely to happen the more we talk. For example, you mentioned the issue of the article published by the American Information Agency and that was sad. And a formal apology was presented.
HUSSEIN: Your stance is generous. We are Arabs. It is enough for us that someone says, "I am sorry. I made a mistake." Then we carry on. But the media campaign continued. And it is full of stories. If the stories were true, no one would get upset. But we understand from its continuation that there is a determination.
GLASPIE: I saw the Diane Sawyer program on ABC. And what happened in that program was cheap and unjust. And this is a real picture of what happens in the American media -- even to American politicians themselves. These are the methods the Western media employs. I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats who stand up to the media. Because your appearance in the media, even for five minutes, would help us to make the American people understand Iraq. This would increase mutual understanding. If they American President had control of the media, his job would be much easier.
Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. President Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.
You are right. It is true what you say that we do not want higher prices for oil. But I would ask you to examine the possibility of not charging too high a price for oil.
HUSSEIN: We do not want too high prices for oil. And I remind you that in 1974 I gave Tariq Aziz the idea for an article he wrote which criticized the policy of keeping oil prices high. It was the first Arab article which expressed this view.
Shifting Price of Oil
TARIQ AZIZ: Our policy in OPEC opposes sudden jumps in oil prices.
HUSSEIN: Twenty-five dollars a barrel is not a high price.
GLASPIE: We have many Americans who would like to see the price go above $25 because they come from oil-producing states.
HUSSEIN: The price at one stage had dropped to $12 a barrel and a reduction in the modest Iraqi budget of $6 billion to $7 billion is a disaster.
GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.
I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us?
My assessment after 25 years' service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can see only that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship -- not in the spirit of confrontation -- regarding your intentions.
I simply describe the position of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one.
HUSSEIN: We do not ask people not to be concerned when peace is at issue. This is a noble human feeling which we all feel. It is natural for you as a superpower to be concerned. But what we ask is not to express your concern in a way that would make an aggressor believe that he is getting support for his aggression.
We want to find a just solution which will give us our rights but not deprive others of their rights. But at the same time, we want the others to know that our patience is running out regarding their action, which is harming even the milk our children drink, and the pensions of the widow who lost her husband during the war, and the pensions of the orphans who lost their parents.
As a country, we have the right to prosper. We lost so many opportunities, and the others should value the Iraqi role in their protection. Even this Iraqi [the President points to their interpreter] feels bitter like all other Iraqis. We are not aggressors but we do not accept aggression either. We sent them envoys and handwritten letters. We tried everything. We asked the Servant of the Two Shrines -- King Fahd -- to hold a four-member summit, but he suggested a meeting between the Oil Ministers. We agreed. And as you know, the meeting took place in Jidda. They reached an agreement which did not express what we wanted, but we agreed.
Only two days after the meeting, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister made a statement that contradicted the agreement. We also discussed the issue during the Baghdad summit. I told the Arab Kings and Presidents that some brothers are fighting an economic war against us. And that not all wars use weapons and we regard this kind of war as a military action against us. Because if the capability of our army is lowered then, if Iran renewed the war, it could achieve goals which it could not achieve before. And if we lowered the standard of our defenses, then this could encourage Israel to attack us. I said that before the Arab Kings and Presidents. Only I did not mention Kuwait and U.A.E. by name, because they were my guests.
Before this, I had sent them envoys reminding them that our war had included their defense. Therefore the aid they gave us should not be regarded as a debt. We did not more than the United States would have done against someone who attacked its interests.
I talked about the same thing with a number of other Arab states. I explained the situation t brother King Fahd a few times, by sending envoys and on the telephone. I talked with brother King Hussein and with Sheik Zaid after the conclusion of the summit. I walked with the Sheik to the plane when he was leaving Mosul. He told me, "Just wait until I get home." But after he had reached his destination, the statements that came from there were very bad -- not from him, but from his Minister of Oil.
And after the Jidda agreement, we received some intelligence that they were talking of sticking to the agreement for two months only. Then they would change their policy. Now tell us, if the American President found himself in this situation, what would he do? I said it was very difficult for me to talk about these issues in public. But we must tell the Iraqi people who face economic difficulties who was responsible for that.
Talks with Mubarak
GLASPIE: I spent four beautiful years in Egypt.
HUSSEIN: The Egyptian people are kind and good and ancient. The oil people are supposed to help the Egyptian people, but they are mean beyond belief. It is painful to admit it, but some of them are disliked by Arabs because of their greed.
GLASPIE: Mr. President, it would be helpful if you could give us an assessment of the effort made by your Arab brothers and whether they have achieved anything.
HUSSEIN: On this subject, we agreed with President Mubarak that the Prime Minister of Kuwait would meet with the deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council in Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis initiated contact with us, aided by President Mubarak's efforts. He just telephoned me a short while ago to say the Kuwaitis have agreed to that suggestion.
HUSSEIN: A protocol meeting will be held in Saudi Arabia. Then the meeting will be transferred to Baghdad for deeper discussion directly between Kuwait and Iraq. We hope we will reach some result. We hope that the long-term view and the real interests will overcome Kuwaiti greed.
GLASPIE: May I ask you when you expect Sheik Saad to come to Baghdad?
HUSSEIN: I suppose it would be on Saturday or Monday at the latest. I told brother Mubarak that the agreement should be in Baghdad Saturday or Sunday. You know that brother Mubarak's visits have always been a good omen.
GLASPIE: This is good news. Congratulations.
HUSSEIN: Brother President Mubarak told me they were scared. They said troops were only 20 kilometers north of the Arab League line. I said to him that regardless of what is there, whether they are police, border guards or army, and regardless of how many are there, and what they are doing, assure the Kuwaitis and give them our word that we are not going to do anything until we meet with them. When we meet and when we see that there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death, even though wisdom is above everything else. There you have good news.
AZIZ: This is a journalistic exclusive.
GLASPIE: I am planning to go to the United States next Monday. I hope I will meet with President Bush in Washington next week. I thought to postpone my trip because of the difficulties we are facing. But now I will fly on Monday.
I know that what I have placed before you today and will continue tomorrow, is considerable in length, but the subject and possibility of war is of tremendous importance. If President Bush fulfills the desire that is in his mind and heart to go to war, such action will result in a disproportionate amount of Black Americans, many of whom are poor and live in your districts, sacrificing their lives in Iraq for reasons that they do not know or fully understand. I hope that you will have your staffs research the areas I have focused attention upon, and help you formulate statements and questions to be delivered and presented in the committee hearing, particularly to witnesses Mr. Richard Perle and Mr. James Woolsey, who are bent upon military action against Iraq.
Wednesday, September 18, 2002